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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

\ \'. SMOOT BHl)lllALL, Conunissioner of Financial Institutions of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
12064

SEAGCLL INYEST~IENT
COl\IPANY,
Appellant and Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on real
property located in Utah County, State of Utah. The
appellant tiled a counter claim to quiet title to the property subject to the mortgage.
This is the second action filed to foreclose the mort.~ag-e whieh is the subject of this action. An earlier com1
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plaint, ci,·il no. 30,293, was filed in the District Court
of Ctah County on November 2.3, 1966. Almost two
years passed after civil action 30,293 was filed Lefore
a summons was issued. On October 30, 1908, a summons
was issued in the first action. The summons was serve<l
Oil November a, 1968.
The def en<lants made a motion to quash the service
of summons issued October 30, 1968, and served ~o
vember 3, 1968, in civil no. 30,293 because it was not
served within the time limited by Rule 4 ( b) U.R.C.P.
The court granted that motion. Subsequently the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41
(a) ( l ) U .R .C .P. in civil no. 30,293.
Plaintiff then commenced this action to foreclose
the mortgage. The defendant claims that civil case no.
30,293 was dismissed in such a fashion as to bring this
action within the "two dismissal" rule.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COl!R'f
The present action was tried at Provo, Utah, before
the Hon. ~laurice Harding, presiding. C pon the hearing of the matter, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and held that the two dismissal rule under Rule
41 (a) ( 1) l"' .R .C.P. does not apply to this particular
case. The court, therefore, ordered that the property
be foreclosed and gave judgment to the plaintiff in the
amount of $14,304.41 principal, interest in the amount
of $.3,195.08 to July 15, 1969, and attorney's fees and
2
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rnsls. The defendant's appeal from the lower court's
<lecision requests that an order be issued quieting title
tu the property as against the plaintiff an<l ren~rsing
the judgment of the trial court .

RELIEF ON APPEAL
Hespondent requests that the court affirm the lower
court's decision and that the appeal be dismissed.

ARGU~IENT

The facts of this case do not lend themselves to the
application of the two dismissal rule. According to the
general rules of law governing dismissal, an action can
be dismissed but one time. The dismissal or nonsuit
leaves the action as if the suit had never been filed, and
takes with it all prior rulings and orders in the case.
II A.L.R.2d 1411. Such a dismissal annulled any
orders or rulings made in the case so that the action
is as if it had never been. In effect, the parties are out
of court as to the case dismissed. 24 Am.J ur.2d 6162.
The summons issued on November 30, 1968, was
not an initiation of a new action, but was a summons
which was served pursuant to the complaint tiled on
Del'emher 25, 1966. The summons was a regular 20
day summons with an attached complaint. This fact is
substantiated by the civil number set forth on the summons. The number found there is the same as the one

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

marked on the complaint filed in November, l 9tiu.
Furthermore, no new filing fees have been pai<l by the
plaintiff for the commencement of a new action. There
was no intention by the plaintiff to initiate a new action.
If the plaintiff had intended to begin a new action with
the service of the summons, the summons would have
been in the form of a 10 <lay summons rather than the
ordinary 20 day summons.
The plaintiff contends that this matter has been
dismissed but once. Furthermore, notice of dismissal,
filed by the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41 (a) (I) U.R.
C.P. did not operate as a second dismissal of the action.
That notice pertained to the complaint written and filed
in civil no. 30,293 which had already been deemed dismissed by Rule 4 U.R.C.P.
Applying the facts of this case to the rules set forth
above, plaintiff contends that the dismissal of the action
pursant to the defendant's motion made the suit as if
it had not hen filed by the plaintiff. Based upon that
conclusion, the only way in which a second dismissal
could have been entered, thereby bringing the matter
within the application of the two dismissal rule, would
have been to file a new and separate pleading, paying
new filing fees and costs, and filing a new complaint
and summons. The record indicates that such an action
was not commenced. The above entitled matter could
ha ,.e been dismissed but once.
The case of Thomas vs. Braffet's Heirs, 6. C.:.?cl
57, 305 P.2d 507 ( 1956), is substantiating law to the
4
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plaintiff. ln Thomas, the court was faced with a two
dismissal rule. There the action was to quiet title to
a certain piece of property located in Duchesne County,
C tah. There were a number of actions filed in that case.
The first action was filed on ~lay 22, 1946, and was
dismissed upon plaintiff's request. The second action
was filed on October 27, 1951, under a new civil number.
Plaintiffs again requested that the court dismiss the
action and the dismissal was granted. On September 14,
1953, the court entered an order dismissing the action
as to those defendants who had not answered. Subsequently one of the defendants intervened and claimed
an interest in the property. The argument was made
that Rule 41 (a) (1) U.R.C.P. caused the dismissal to
the intervening defendants to be an adjudication on the
merits. The court held that under Rule 41 (a) (I) such
a dismissal did operate as an adjudication on the merits.
Each of the prior actions in the Thomas case were commenced by the filing of a new complaint, paying new
filing fees and obtaining new civil numbers. In this case
but one action was commenced prior to this action and
it was commenced by the filing of a complaint.
The case now before the court contains no record
of two different actions being commenced and subsequently being dismissed. The file indicates filing but
one action and subsequently granting a motion of dismissal of that action.
The court's attention is called to an annotation in
(i.3 A.L.R.2d 742, wherein the two dismissal rule is

5
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<liscusse<l. Cases cited in that annotation come within
the bounds of the rule and make reference to the tiling
of two suits, e.g., the filing of the second suit or the
filing of a third suit. Reference is made to separate and
distinct actions being filed. Under the two dismissal
rule, the plaintiff is entitled to one dismissal of his suit
before a subsequent dismissal will operate against him
as an adjudication on the merits. Crump vs. Goldhouse

Restaurants, Inc., 96 So.2d 215.

CONCLUSION
At the hearing of the matter on its merits, the
defendant failed to apply the facts of this case to substantiate a dismissal under the two dismissal rule. The
plaintiff contends that under the facts of this case, there
has been but one dismissal. The appeal should be dismissed and the decision of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
48 North University A venue
Provo, Utah 84601

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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